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INrERNATIONAL LAw - RETROACTIVE REcoGNITION OF DB FACTO GoVBRN-
MBNT NoT lNvALIDATION OF Acrrs OF Proon DB JURE GoVBRNMBNT-On De-
cember 12, 1949, the Chiang regime on Formosa accepted the offer of an 
American group headed by General Chennault to purchase the physical assets 
of the Nationalist-operated Central Air Transport Corporation, including forty 
aircraft located at Hong Kong. The British government ceased to recognize 
the Nationalists as the de jure government of China on January 5, 1950. There-
after the British announced that they recognized the Communist regime as the 
de facto government of those parts of China they actually controlled, effective 
October 1, 1949, the date the Communists had proclaimed themselves the 
government of China. The Chennault corporation brought an action in Hong 
Kong against the CATC, seeking an order declaring it the owner of the forty 
planes. The action was dismissed on the ground, inter alia, that the recognition 
of the Communist regime operated retroactively to "validate"1 its actions and 
to invalidate the actions of the Chiang government subsequent to October 1, 
1949, thereby annulling the sale of December 12, 1949. On appeal to the Privy 
Council, held, reversed. Retroactivity of recognition operates primarily "to 
validate acts of a de facto government which has subsequently become the new 
de jure government, and not to invalidate acts of the previous de jure govern-
ment." Civil Air Transport, Inc. 11. Central Air Transport Corp.,[1953] A.C. 
(P.C. 1952) 70 at 93. 
The principal case is one of two which have passed on the validity of acts 
of a former government after the state of the forum has ceased to recognize it 
as a de jure government. In Gdynia Ameryka Linie 11. Boguslawski2 the Polish 
government-in-exile offered a terminal pay settlement to those men who left 
the Polish merchant fleet rather than return to Soviet-dominated Poland. When 
the offer was accepted subsequent to the recognition of the Polish provisional 
government, a British court held that there resulted a contract binding on the 
state-owned line. The new Polish government claimed existence prior to the 
date of the offer in controversy, and argued as an extension of the retroactivity 
doctrine that the acts of the old government during the interim were invalid. 
This argument was rejected by the court on a territorial jurisdiction distinction: 
retroactivity operates only in that area under de facto control prior to the de 
jure recognition.3 In the principal case the court accepted the territorial juris-
1 Although now conventional phraseology, the use of "validate" is perhaps misleading. 
See Moore, "The New Isolation," 27 AM. J. INT. L. 607 at 618 (1933): ''Recognition 
'validates' nothing. On the contrary, it opens the way to the diplomatic controversion of 
the validity of any and all 'actions and conduct' that may be regarded as illegal." This was 
in criticism of Justice Clark's use of the term in Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 
297 at 303, 38 S.Ct. 309 (1918). Even if it is conceded that Moore's stand is correct at 
least as to public international law, the fact remains that "validate" has become a term of 
art, embodying the implications of a large number of decisions. See Stevenson, ''Effect of 
Recognition on the Application of Private International Law Norms," 51 CoL. L. RHv. 710 
(1951); Mann, "Sacrosanctity of the Foreign Act of State," 59 L.Q. RHv. 42, 155 (1943). 
Mann points out that "the invalidity of the act of State was not in issue in any of the 
American decisions." Id. at 163. 
2 [1953] A.C. (H.L. 1952) 11. 
s The court of appeal had treated the retroactivity problem as not strictly in point, 
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diction limitation with only minor reservations.4 The doctrine of retroactive 
validation of prior acts of newly recognized governments is at least as well 
established in England as in the United States.5 In spite of the distinction 
drawn between retroactive validation and retroactive invalidation in the present 
case,6 it and the Boguslawski case seem to represent simply an application of the 
territorial jurisdiction limitation on retroactivity. In the United States the 
existence of such a limitation is not at all clear. 7 The Supreme Court in United 
States v. Pink8 came close to a result contrary to that reached in England. That 
case upheld the assignment by the Soviet government to the United States 
under the Lltvinov Agreement9 of the American assets of Russian companies 
which the Soviets had nationalized prior to their recognition by this country. 
This result may be viewed as an extraterritorial extension of the retroactivity 
doctrine.10 It may also be viewed as a manifestation of the Court's willingness 
to give effect to "national foreign policy as evidenced by the terms of an 
viewing the case merely as one involving a normal succession of governments. Gdynia 
Ameryka Linie v. Boguslawski, [1951] 1 K.B. (1950) 162 at 173. The subsequent 
acceptance of the offer was considered permissible on a vested rights analysis. 
4 The opinion is not clear regarding the reservations. The court refers to the case of 
a ship on the high seas seized by insurgents and brought into port under de facto control. 
Apparently it had in mind The Arantzazu Mendi, [1939] A.C. (H.L.) 256. There the 
Spanish Republican regime was denied the right to arrest a vessel of Spanish registry, 
because the Franco forces, recognized as a de facto government, were in possession. 
Although the Republican regime was recognized as the de jure government of all Spain, 
it was thus unable to implead another sovereign state. However, the court in the present 
case also cites Banco de Bilbao v. Sancha, [1938] 2 K.B. 176, which held that Franco's de 
facto government in Bilbao was the proper government to pass enactments concerning a 
bank having its corporate home in Bilbao, even though the Republican regime remained 
the recognized de jure government. Neither of these cases involved retroactivity, but they 
have obvious implications as to the effect of retroactivity in the event of subsequent de jure 
recognition of the de facto regime. The court wisely distinguished the instant case as 
presenting a simple issue of title to chattels located outside the area of de facto control. 
Principal case at 94. 
5 Mann, "Sacrosanctity of the Foreign Act of State," 59 L.Q. REv. 155 at 162 et seq. 
(1943); Luther v. Sagor & Co., [1921] 3 K.B. 532; Princess Paley Olga v. Weisz, [1929] 
1 K.B. 718. 
6 See principal case at 93, and quotation therefrom in text supra. 
7 The court in the Boguslawski case, note 2 supra, at 30, quotes Justice Stone's 
opinion in Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126 at 140, 58 S.Ct. 785 
(1938), calling for a distinction on a territorial basis and also on the validate-invalidate 
dichotomy. However, the passage quoted does not seem to have been necessary to the 
decision. See 26 CALIF. L. RBv. 713 (1938). Certainly the case was given no such import 
by either the majority or dissenting opinions in United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 62 
S.Ct. 552 (1942). See text supra at note 7 et seq. 
s Note 7 supra. 
9 See Establishment -of Diplomatic Relations with the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics, Dept. of State, Eastern European Series, No. 1 (1933). See also the account in 
28 AM.. J. lNr. L. SUPP. 1 (1934). 
10 Borchard, ''Extraterritorial Confiscations," 36 AM.. J. lNr. L. 275 at 279 (1942); 
51 YALB L.J. 848 at 851 (1942). 
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executive agreement."11 The basic reasoning of subsequent lower court cases 
is similarly ill-denned.12 
The recent litigation between the Chiang regime and the Wells Fargo 
Bank suggests the possibility that the United States may -::i.ow abandon the 
ambiguity of the Pink case and adopt a limitation essentially the same as that 
in the principal case. A federal district court at first refused to award Chinese 
funds on deposit with the Wells Fargo Bank either to the Bank of China, a 
substantially government-owned corporation, or to representatives of the new 
Communist regime.13 In effect this decision denied the continuing force of 
the United States' recognition of the Nationalist govemment.14 On rehearing, 
the court awarded the funds to the Nationalist management.15 However, this 
decision was based primarily on the ground that the Nationalist government 
had become sufficiently stable to promote the Bank's corporate interests, and 
that as between the Nationalist and Communist regimes the court should 
accept the executive's decision as to which was "best able to further the mutual 
interests of China and the United States."16 The court expressly rejected a 
straight territorial limitation on the validity of acts of non-recognized govem-
ments, 17 which would seem to impeach any such limitation in the event of 
subsequent recognition. The court also chose to view the Pink case as requiring 
"that full faith and credit be accorded those acts which our executive has ex-
pressly sanctioned"18-thus rejecting the extraterritorial validation theory of 
that case. If the Wells Fargo Bank has assets in England the way is now open 
for an interesting claim to be pressed by the "Communist Bank of China." It 
seems clear that much more litigation will be required to :6.x the bounds of the 
retroactivity doctrine. 
Duncan Noble, S.Ed. 
11 Stevenson, "United States v. Pink-A Reappraisal," 48 CoL. L. REv. 890 at 894 
(1948). The difficulty with this view is that the entire Litvinov Agreement gives no 
evidence whatever on the executive's wishes concerning extraterritorial retroactivity. 
12 Stevenson, ''Effect of Recognition on the Application of Private International Law 
Norms," 51 Cor .. L. REv. 710 at 722 et seq. (1951). 
13 Bank of China v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., (D.C. Cal. 1950) 92 F. 
Supp. 920. 
14 This of course was not the expressed rationale of the decision. However, the fear of 
early recognition of the Communist regime seems the only plausible explanation of the 
court's virtual abdication of the judicial function. 
15 Bank of China v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., (D.C. Cal. 1952) 104 F. 
Supp. 59. 
16Jd. at 66. 
17Jd. at 63. 
lSJd. at 64. 
